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In recent years, a number of reports have suggested that climate change will result in new 
waves of human migration, as people leave areas affected by sea-level rise, flooding, 
drought and other projected climate change impacts (Action Aid International, 2007; 
Christian Aid, 2007; Conisbee and Simms, 2003; Renaud, et al., 2007; Stern, 2007; Warner, 
et al., 2009). For example, the Stern Review (2007) suggested that 150-200 million people 
could be displaced by climate change by 2050. However, the relationship between climate 
change and migration is complex, and the available evidence shows that people make 
pragmatic, disaster-specific choices about where best to move in the face of environmental 
disasters (Naik, 2009: 273). These decisions are themselves mediated by a range of 
‘intervening factors’ that either facilitate or constrain migration, including ease of transport, 
access to social networks and government policies that restrict or encourage migration 
(Black et al, 2011: 432). While there is some evidence to indicate that people move in 
response to climate events, in the context of low-income countries this often consists of 
short-distance, internal migration rather than overseas migration. 
Despite increasing awareness of the complex linkages between migration and climate 
change, there is limited analysis on how issues of human mobility are currently addressed in 
national climate change adaption strategies. In response to this, the Migrating out of 
Poverty RPC conducted a comprehensive review of how migration is discussed in National 
Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs), which are national adaptation plans developed 
by Least Developed Countries (LDCs). NAPAs are intended to provide LDCs with an 
opportunity to create country-driven adaptation strategies that address immediate 
adaptation needs. Many LDCs face comparatively difficult challenges in adapting to climate 
change, as by definition they have severe structural impediments to growth including low 
per capita income, low levels of human capital and high levels of economic vulnerability. 
The Migrating out of Poverty RPC’s review of NAPAs investigated that ways in which these 
policy documents discuss a range of migration-related issues including drought-induced 
migration, rural exodus, transhumance, refugees, population displacement, resettlement, 
and other issues. Each policy document was searched for key migration-related terminology, 
and subsequent analysis was done in order to clarify the context in which each of these terms 
was mentioned. The results of the review, which are presented in detail in this working 
paper, showed that consideration of migration issues varied widely across countries’ NAPAs. 
While some countries discussed in-depth the way that various types of migration were 
relevant to their national adaptation challenges, other countries scarcely accounted for 
migration issues in their NAPAs. 
From a policy perspective, to the extent that autonomous migration is mentioned at all in 
NAPAs’ proposed adaptation projects – which are termed ‘priority projects’ – it is typically 
viewed as impacting negatively on adaptation. While 13 NAPAs refer to rural exodus and 
nine refer to transhumance in their priority projects, these policy often involve investing in 
projects which will function in part to stop migration flows. Meanwhile, 14 countries 
introduce policies related to resettlement or population displacement, illustrating the 
perceived importance of protecting vulnerable communities in many NAPAs. Additionally, a 
number of proposed NAPA priority projects emphasise the perceived negative impacts of 
migration: three NAPAs view migration as barrier to proposed priority projects; two NAPAs 
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attempt to resolve migration’s detrimental impact on the provision of services in their 
priority projects; and one refers to conflict-driven migration. Tellingly, 13 NAPAs do not 
discuss migration issues in their proposed adaptation projects at all. 
This working paper also includes a case study on NAPAs from West Africa, which was 
selected because there are a relatively large number of NAPAs that have been produced by 
LDCs from this region (10) and there is a long history of regional migration due to 
environmental and other factors. The case study highlights three themes commonly 
discussed across NAPAs from this region: (1) migration that is already occurring in response 
to recent droughts in West Africa; (2) the present and future threat posed to communities 
by sea-level rise and flooding; and (3) the perceived negative impacts of migration, such as 
conflict over land, environmental degradation, and pressure on urban areas. Gaps in the 
discussion of migration and environmental change in West African NAPAs are also identified 
by the case study. 
The working paper concludes with policy lessons that emerged from the Migrating out of 
Poverty RPC’s review of migration in NAPAs. While policymakers often emphasis the negative 
impacts of migration in low-income countries, especially rural-urban migration, there is 
evidence that such flows can play an important role in building adaptive capacity to climate 
change, for example by diversifying rural household income sources and leading to positive 
development impacts. While adaptation policies are needed in rural areas, such policies 
cannot be expected to stop rural-urban migration. Indeed, attempts to halt rural-urban flows 
by investing in rural areas – a common policy approach in many low-income and middle-
income countries – have generally failed in all but the short term. Rather than attempting to 
stop these flows, more focus needs to be put on integrating urban planning in national 
adaptation strategies. Related to this, migration must be seen not only as a failure of 
development or adaptation, but as potentially contributing to livelihood strategies in low-
income countries. Such an approach would focus attention on the vulnerabilities of 
livelihoods to climate change, and highlight the potential benefits and risks that migration 
brings in the context of on-going environmental change. 
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1. Introduction: climate change adaptation and migration 
Although there has been increased discussion and debate in recent years in both academic 
and policy circles concerning the impact of climate change on human migration, little 
attention has been focused on how existing climate change policies discuss migration. This 
paper attempts to partly address this research gap by outlining the findings of the Migration 
RPC’s comprehensive review of migration in National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPAs), the national climate change adaptation plans for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
The Migration RPC’s study provides the most comprehensive review of the discussion of 
migration in NAPAs to date, including an in-depth look at how NAPAs discuss a wide range of 
migration-related issues including drought-induced migration, rural exodus, transhumance 
and refugees, as well as displacement and resettlement, among other topics. The review 
found that discussion of migration issues varies widely across different countries’ NAPAs, 
with some countries undertaking in-depth discussions of the relationship between migration 
and climate change while others scarcely consider the topic relevant to their national 
adaptation strategies. Where NAPAs discuss migration, they are typically concerned with 
internal migration, as opposed to international migratory flows – unlike other types of policy 
documents such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Black and Sward, 2009) and 
Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs) (Deshingkar, et al., 2012) which mainly discuss 
international migratory flows. From a policy perspective, most LDCs retain a negative view of 
migration, as their proposed policies often seek to halt or reduce autonomous forms of 
migration, especially rural exodus. 
LDCs by definition are low-income countries with weak human assets and high levels of 
economic vulnerability1. NAPAs provide an opportunity for LDCs to produce country-driven 
plans that identify priority activities to address immediate climate change adaptation needs 
(UNFCCC, 2011). NAPAs, which are funded through the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat, thus have a potentially pivotal role to 
play in launching coordinated climate change adaptation efforts in LDCs. This is acutely 
important because although LDCs have played a negligible role in contributing to the 
greenhouse gas emissions that are the primary cause of anthropogenic climate change, their 
inhabitants are nevertheless highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change given the 
relatively weak baseline capacity for adaptation that exists in most LDCs. 
LDCs are primarily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and thus the majority of NAPAs 
produced to date have been created by states in this region. In fact, by the end of 2010, 45 
countries had submitted NAPAs to the UNFCCC Secretariat and 29 of these countries were 
in Sub-Saharan Africa2. Thus, to a large extent the Migration RPC’s review of migration in 
NAPAs involved examining the ways in which Sub-Saharan African countries account for 
migration in their NAPAs, owing to the relatively large number of NAPAs that have been 
1 Least Developed Countries are determined by several criteria, including gross national income per capita, the 
Human Asset Index and the Economic Vulnerability Index – with each of the latter two combining a range of 
indicators. Additionally, only countries with 75 million inhabitants or fewer can be classified as LDCs (UN CDP, 
2008). 
2 This figure includes African island nations that are designated as part of Sub-Saharan Africa by the UN, 
including Sao Tome and Principe, Comoros, Cape Verde and Madagascar. 
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produced by countries in this region. Two North African countries have also submitted 
NAPAs, along with seven Asian LDCs, five Pacific Island Countries (PICs), and Yemen and 
Haiti – the lone representatives of the Middle East and the Caribbean, respectively3. Thus, 
the vast majority of the countries that have completed NAPAs are located in Africa, Asia 
or the Pacific. 
Although recent research (Tacoli, 2011) has suggested that internal migration can play a 
vital role in building resilience to climate change impacts in developing countries, there 
appears to be little recognition of this in NAPAs. While a number of NAPAs recognise 
migration to be a coping strategy adopted by people in the face of climatic stress, this 
acknowledgement is often tempered by the assertion that climate-induced migration 
often has negative impacts in receiving areas, such as conflict over land in rural zones and 
overcrowding in cities. Few adaptation activities proposed in NAPAs actively support 
autonomous migration, which is typically viewed as a problem associated with climate 
change that needs to be resolved through policy interventions. Additionally, the need to 
resettle or relocate vulnerable communities is repeatedly mentioned in NAPAs, while 
human displacement related to conflict also garners significant discussion, as this type of 
migration is seen as exacerbating the climate change adaptation challenges faced in some 
LDCs. This working paper provides an overview of the general findings of the review and 
also includes a case study of NAPAs from the West African region. Before detailing the 
review’s findings, the remainder of Section 1 will examine the NAPAs policy process, 
summarise the existing evidence on migration and environmental change and provide a 
brief overview of the review’s methodology. 
1.1 Climate change adaptation in Least Developed Countries: the significance of NAPAs 
The NAPA policy process consists of each LDC identifying national adaptation priority 
projects that must be implemented in the immediate future in order to address urgent 
climate change adaptation needs (Adger, et al., 2007: 731). NAPAs generally contain a 
number of standard elements, including background information on the country, an 
assessment of the country’s main vulnerabilities to climate change, potential barriers to the 
implementation of adaptation activities, a list of possible adaptation projects and profiles for 
each project which is to be implemented (UNFCCC, 2011). Although NAPAs are primarily 
country-driven documents, LDCs do receive support from external actors in the preparation 
of their NAPAs. Each country selects a Global Environment Facility (GEF) agency to provide 
technical assistance on the planning and implementation of its NAPA, with relevant GEF 
agencies including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, among others4. Additionally, the Least Developed 
3 Three LDCs had not yet submitted NAPAs to the UNFCCC Secretariat at the time of the review, namely Angola, 
Myanmar and Timor-Leste. Angola and Timor-Leste submitted their NAPAs in late 2011, while Myanmar’s NAPA 
has not yet been finalised. 
4 Other GEF agencies include the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations 
Development Organisation. 
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Country Expert Group (LEG), which is made up of climate change experts from LDCs, is 
available to provide technical support and advice to LDCs (UNFCCC, 2011). 
Perhaps the main benefit of NAPAs lies in their potential to enhance planning capacity in LDCs 
to address current and future climate threats (Berger, 2011). Nevertheless, the NAPAs policy 
process has been the target of some pointed critiques in recent years. For example, the UNDP 
was quite critical of the potential impact of NAPAs in its 2007/2008 Human Development 
Report (cited in Martin, 2010b: 401), arguing that: 
First, they provide a very limited response to the adaptation challenge, focussing 
primarily on ‘climate proofing’ through small-scale projects... Second, the NAPAs have, 
in most countries, been developed outside of the institutional framework for national 
planning on poverty reduction. The upshot is a project-based response that fails to 
integrate adaptation planning into the development of wider policies for overcoming 
vulnerability and marginalization5. 
Others have criticized NAPAs for conducting narrow consultation processes which exclude 
the most vulnerable groups in society (Huq and Khan, 2006: 196). They argue that NAPAs 
would benefit from pursuing adaptation measures that focus on the ‘vulnerabilities of 
livelihood support systems’, as opposed to NAPAs’ current sector-based approach that 
evaluates climate change impacts according to their predicted impacts in each sector (Huq 
and Khan, 2006: 196). 
In addition to these critiques, the LEG has also noted that many LDCs have experienced 
problems during the implementation phase of their NAPAs, including delays in accessing 
funding after individual priority projects have been approved (LEG, 2011: 5). Indeed, there is 
continued uncertainty surrounding NAPAs’ long-term funding. In late 2009, developed 
countries pledged sustained funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts in 
developing countries as part of the non-binding Copenhagen Accord reached at the 15th 
session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 15), with US$30 billion in ‘new and 
additional’ funds promised for developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation activities from 
2010 to 2012 and US$100 billion per year pledged in support of these activities by 2020 
(Martin, 2010b: 401-402). However, recent developments have raised serious questions 
about the stability of NAPAs financing: Of the US$30 billion pledged by developed countries 
under the Copenhagen Accord for 2010 to 2012 – commonly referred to as ‘fast-start climate 
funds’ – just US$2.9 billion has been specifically pledged to support adaptation efforts (Ciplet, 
et al., 2010: 1)6. The amount pledged by donor countries that is to be channelled through the 
UNFCCC, including the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) which supports the 
preparation and implementation of NAPAs, is even more meagre. As of 31 March 2011, 
developed countries had pledged just over US$324 million to the LDCF and had deposited just 
US$253.7 million in the fund (Climate Funds Update, 2011). 
5 Perhaps partly in response to these criticisms, at the 16th session of the Conference of Parties (COP 16) in 
Cancun in December 2010, the mandate of the LEG was broadened: The group is now charged, inter alia, with 
integrating NAPAs into development planning (UNFCCC, 2011). 
6 The latest details on climate funds pledged by donors can be found on the Climate Funds Update website: 
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/least-developed-countries-fund. 
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The relatively small amount of funding that has thus far been made available to the LDCF 
reflects wider tensions between developed and developing countries relating to how fast-
track climate funds that have been pledged by developed countries should be dispersed. 
Ciplet and colleagues (Ciplet, et al., 2010: 4) argue that, ‘No other funding issue finds 
Southern countries so united as the call for [fast-track climate] funds to be administered by 
the UNFCCC.’ Despite this, many funds pledged by developed countries as part of the fast-
track climate funds have already been directed to Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) 
administered by international financial institutions (Ciplet, et al., 2010: 1). This issue was 
addressed to some degree at COP 16 in Cancun in December 2010, where the parties agreed 
to establish the Green Climate Fund, which will operate as the financial mechanism of the 
UNFCCC and will be governed by a board composed of equal members of developed and 
developing countries (COP, 2010). While the fund’s stated aim is to mobilise US$100 billion 
per year by 2020, there was no agreement at COP 16 about how the funds for the Green 
Climate Fund will be generated (Blinch and Buckley, 2010), creating the possibility of 
continued disagreement about how pledged adaptation funds are dispersed in the coming 
years, which could in turn impact the NAPAs process. 
Despite these apparent shortcomings of NAPAs, it is encouraging that migration has been 
increasingly incorporated into the wider UNFCCC negotiation process in recent years. 
Although it did not affect that NAPAs under consideration in this working paper, the Cancun 
Adaption Framework agreed at COP 16 in Cancun in December 2010 explicitly mentioned 
migration, potentially paving the way for migration-related adaptation activities to be funded 
through the UNFCCC in the coming years (Warner, 2011). Paragraph 14(f) of the agreement 
states that parties should pursue, ‘Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and 
cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned 
relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels’ (Warner, 2011: 
22). Warner argues that although the Cancun Adaptation Framework presents migration as a 
technical problem to be ‘managed’ – rather than a political issue - its language implies that 
human mobility may play an important role in broader societal transformations needed for 
adaptation over the longer term (Warner, 2011: 29). 
1.2 Migration and climate change: uncertainties about flows and severity of impacts 
As Black and colleagues (2011: 431) note, in recent years a number of reports have examined 
the relationship between climate change and migration (Action Aid International, 2007; 
Christian Aid, 2007; Conisbee and Simms, 2003; Renaud, et al., 2007; Stern, 2007; Warner, et 
al., 2009). Nearly all of these reports assert that new waves of climate change-induced 
migration will emerge in the coming decades, linked in many instances to the presumed 
failure of climate change adaptation measures (Black, et al., 2011: 431). To cite just two 
prominent examples, the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 
2007: 77), based on previous work by Myers (Myers and Kent, 1995), estimated that 150-200 
million people could be displaced by climate change impacts in the coming decades, while a 
Christian Aid (2007) report claimed that up to one billion people could be ‘climate refugees’ 
by 2050. While these reports have undoubtedly helped to increase awareness of the 
potential linkages between migration and climate change, the estimates that they cite are 
based on rather crude calculations that assume widespread out-migration from areas that 
are negatively impacted by climate change, leading the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
(Wilbanks, et al., 2007: 365) to describe these estimates as, ‘at best, guesswork’. 
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In fact, existing research on the relationship between climate events and migration has not 
established conclusive findings to suggest that either sudden-onset climate events (floods, 
storms, etc.) or slow-onset climate events (drought, desertification, etc.) necessarily lead to 
widespread permanent out-migration (Black, et al., 2008: 18). The reason that this 
relationship is non-linear is because increases in migration are not solely a function of climatic 
events, but are mediated by a range of intervening factors that can either facilitate or hinder 
migration in the event of environmental change (Black, et al., 2008: 11). Some common 
examples of mediating factors include relative ease of transportation, access to family or 
social networks in potential destination areas and government policies that work to restrict or 
facilitate emigration, immigration or internal migration (Black, et al., 2008: 11). These 
intervening factors help to shape migration flows, along with economic, social, political, 
demographic and environmental ‘drivers’ (including climate change) that encourage 
migration out of certain areas to particular destinations (Black, et al., 2011: 432). Thus, as 
Black and colleagues (2011: 432) argue, ‘the impacts of climate change on mobility are 
mediated through... different drivers with the result that the relationship between migration 
and climate change becomes highly complex.’ 
Despite the lack of a clear relationship between migration and climate change, there is some 
evidence to suggest that internal migration in particular is a common response to climate 
events (Kniveton, et al., 2009: 76). For example, Kniveton, et al., (2009: 74) observe that, ‘... 
there is broad agreement that internal migration often intensifies following major droughts 
or famines’, and indeed a range of studies have documented such patterns of mobility 
(Shipton, 1990; Findley, 1994; Pederson, 1995; Ezra, 2001; Perch-Nielsen, 2004). Similarly, a 
recent study on migration and environmental degradation in Nepal found that environmental 
deterioration in rural areas primarily resulted in short-distance moves within the immediate 
vicinity of the affected communities, as opposed to long-distance migration to cities (Massey, 
et al., 2007). Evidence of such internal migratory movements is not solely limited to slow-
onset climatic events. According to one study, 88 per cent of residents of agricultural 
communities in Bangladesh were found to remain within two miles of their previous 
residence following the erosion of land and loss of homes due to flooding (Zaman, 1989), 
highlighting the relevance of short-distance internal migration in the face of sudden onset 
climate shocks as well. 
As the above examples make clear, internal migration in response to climatic events is not 
limited to rural-to-urban migration. Indeed, the direction of internal flows may vary according 
to the nature of the environmental stress or shock in question. For example, one study in the 
Indian state of Gujarat found that rural villages reported in-migration from cities following an 
earthquake in 2001, as many urban residents dealt with quake losses by returning to their 
extended families in rural areas (Naik, 2009: 272). When the state was experiencing a 
drought, however, this prompted migration in the reverse direction – from villages to cities 
(Naik, 2009: 272). As Naik (2009: 273) summarises, ‘Despite general trends towards 
urbanization in the developing world, the available literature shows that people make 
pragmatic and disaster-specific choices about where best to migrate.’ 
Similarly, the available evidence on the relationship between international migration and 
climate change defies simplistic explanations. While the aforementioned Christian Aid report 
hints at a large volume of international migration occurring as a result of climate change by 
using the term ‘climate refugees’, thus suggesting that there will be considerable 
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international movement of displaced persons, there is a surprising lack of empirical evidence 
of mass overseas migration resulting directly from environmental change or variability (Black, 
et al., 2008), and the evidence that is available is patchy and contradictory. One study from El 
Salvador found that overseas migration increased with poor harvests and loss of livestock, 
but subsequently decreased following an earthquake in the country (Halliday, 2006). 
Meanwhile, two separate studies conducted in different regions in Mexico found that 
international migration to the US either increased or decreased in response to declining 
annual rainfall depending on the study sites (Munshi, 2003; Kniveton, et al., 2008) again 
showing the conflicting nature of available evidence. Studies in the West African countries of 
Burkina Faso (Henry, et al., 2004) and Mali (Findley, et al., 1994), meanwhile, found that 
overseas migration in both these states fell during drought years. 
While it is clearly not possible to draw wide generalisations about migration in LDCs 
because of their varying geographical locations7, there are some lessons highlighted by the 
recent literature on migration and climate change that are relevant to the consideration of 
migration in NAPAs. Considering LDCs as a group, there are a number of particular 
‘intervening factors’ which may influence the relationship between migration and climate 
change in this group of countries. In rural areas, subsistence agriculture continues to be the 
dominant productive activity in many LDCs, with an estimated 70 per cent of people 
employed in this area in African nations, for example (Collier, et al., 2009: 128). In these 
African countries, crops are already grown close to their thermal tolerance, and so a rise in 
temperatures caused by climate change could potentially lead to widespread crop failure 
(Collier, et al., 2009: 128-129), possibly prompting farmers to abandon their land and 
migrate to urban centres. 
Furthermore, many inhabitants of cities in low-income countries are often at-risk from 
climate change impacts, including the increased frequency and intensity of floods, storms 
and heat waves, as well as water supply constraints (Satterthwaite, 2011: 1778). This is 
particularly true of informal or illegal settlements in cities, which often lack drainage and 
other protective infrastructure (Satterthwaite, 2011: 1778). Such settlements are typically 
home to recent rural-urban migrants, so there is reason to believe that many people may in 
fact be migrating into urban contexts characterised by a high degree of vulnerability to 
climate change (Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change, 2011: 10). In other 
cases, the possibilities for migration may be constrained by geography. Small island states, 
including the group of PICs, provide a relevant example as sea-level rise is already 
threatening some low-lying islands and the forced displacement of these populations 
remains a distinct possibility in future decades (Kniveton, et al., 2009: 74). Finally, a number 
of LDCs can also be classified as fragile or post-conflict states, adding a further dimension of 
vulnerability for many segments of the population. 
7 Although a thorough discussion of the geographic variability of climate change impacts is beyond the scope of 
this report, it is likely that different regions will experience heterogeneous climate change impacts. For 
example, while annual rainfall is projected to decrease in Mediterranean Africa, northern Sahara and Southern 
Africa over the coming decades, Eastern Africa could actually see an increase in annual rainfall during this 
period (Mertz, et al., 2009: 745). Such differences present a further variable to consider with regard to the 
relationship between migration and climate change. 
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Broadly speaking, migration – ranging from seasonal, short-distance migration to overseas 
migration – can act as a vital coping mechanism that helps to offset localised impacts of 
climate change and enhance residents’ resilience to climate change (Tacoli, 2010). Indeed, 
citing recent case studies undertaken in Bolivia, Senegal and Tanzania, Tacoli argues that 
migration has become an increasingly important aspect of rural livelihood strategies in the 
face of slow-onset climate change impacts such as desertification, soil degradation, 
disrupted rainfall patterns and changes in temperature (Tacoli, 2011: v). In fact, Tacoli 
observes that, ‘in all study locations the most vulnerable households are unanimously 
identified as those who do not receive remittances from migrant relatives’ (Tacoli, 2011: v). 
This finding illustrates the positive role migration can play in autonomous adaptive 
strategies to climate change, and challenges the notion that these flows are necessarily 
detrimental to adaptation efforts. 
1.3 Migration and NAPAs: an overview of the review methodology 
The Migration RPC’s review of NAPAs sought to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the 
45 NAPAs submitted to the UNFCCC by the end of 2010. Using a methodological approach 
similar to the one that was previously used for reviews of migration in PRSPs (Black and 
Sward, 2009) and DWCPs (Deshingkar, et al., 2012), the review sought to capture the 
overall quantitative and qualitative level of discussion of migration in NAPAs by searching 
each policy document for a range of search terms related to migration, before conducting 
content analysis of each reference to these terms. The group of search terms included in 
the review8 were derived from a literature review on migration and climate change and a 
preliminary review of select NAPAs that were conducted as part of this study. Content 
analysis determined the context in which these terms were discussed and whether this 
discussion was directly related to the NAPAs’ proposed priority projects. Based on this 
content analysis, a typology was created in order to classify NAPAs’ attitudes towards 
migration, focusing on four key areas: (1) references to migration as a coping strategy, (2) 
discussion of displacement or resettlement of populations, (3) the negative side effects of 
climate-related migration, and (4) conflict-driven migration impacting countries’ overall 
adaptation contexts. As mentioned above, the review also included a case study of West 
Africa, based on the rationale that ten countries from this region have completed NAPAs 
and that seasonal and cross-border migration in response to climatic stress has been 
relatively well-documented in this region. This involved additional review of the literature 
and evidence on the relationship between migration and climate change in this region 
(see Section 4). 
The Migration RPC’s review of NAPAs was not the first study to consider how NAPAs discuss 
migration. Martin’s (2010a) previous study of NAPAs took stock of the discussion of migration 
in the 38 NAPAs that had been submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat as of October 
8 The search terms included in the review consisted of words and word roots in order to capture references to 
a range of migration-related phenomena (only references that had a direct bearing on migration were 
counted). The terms included in the review were: migra*, move*, mobil*, rural exodus, displace*, 
resettle*/relocat*, border, refugee, circula*, transhuman*, return, remit*. Terms with an asterisk capture 
multiple words: for example, ‘migra*’ captures inter alia ‘migrant’, ‘migration’, ‘migrate’, etc. 
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20089. Martin (2010a: 1) summarises the findings of her study as follows: ‘Repeatedly, 
countries reference that loss of habitat and livelihoods could precipitate large-scale 
migration, particularly from coastal areas that may be affected by rising sea levels and from 
areas susceptible to increased drought, flooding or other environmental hazards that will 
affect agriculture.’ Martin emphasises NAPAs’ focus on issues of resettlement and land use, 
noting that, ‘Adaptation strategies often propose land use policies and programmes that 
would have the effect of stabilising populations in areas that might experience large-scale 
out-migration in the absence of such measures’ (Martin 2010a: 6-7). She asserts that fewer 
adaptation strategies focus on migration as an explicit adaptation strategy in its own right 
(Martin 2010a: 7). 
The Migration RPC’s review builds on Martin’s previous work, providing a more in-depth 
assessment of the discussion of migration and related terms in NAPAs. Its multi-layered 
methodology allows for an evaluation of differing levels of migration discussion in NAPAs, an 
analysis of the migration issues most frequently mentioned, and a detailed picture of the 
way in which NAPAs incorporate migration into their proposed adaptation activities. 
However, it is important to mention that there were several limitations to the review. The 
review did not undertake a systematic assessment of whether the perceptions of migration 
discussed in NAPAs were backed up by evidence – and instead focused on documenting the 
types of attitudes about migration that exist in NAPAs. A critical assessment of the viability 
of migration-related policies that are proposed in NAPAs was also beyond the scope of the 
review, and with the exception of the West African case study the review did not identify 
gaps in NAPAs’ discussion of migration issues. Instead, the review was conceived of as a 
scanning exercise to ascertain the current views of migration in NAPAs. However, the review 
did seek to develop recommendations on how to improve NAPAs’ treatment of migration in 
future climate change adaptation policy documents, which are included at the conclusion of 
this paper. 
2. General findings: migration in NAPAs 
As was mentioned in Section 1, the discussion of migration in NAPAs overwhelmingly 
focuses on various types of internal migration, with references to international migration 
being largely confined to the mention of refugees in a handful of NAPAs. While recent 
studies (Tacoli, 2011) have suggested that internal migration can play a vital role in building 
resilience to climate change impacts in developing countries, there appears to be little 
recognition of this in NAPAs, as migratory ‘coping strategies’ are often seen as producing 
negative consequences. Moreover, the extent to which migration is discussed in NAPAs 
varies considerably – and it is clear from existing evidence on migration trends in LDCs that 
this variability cannot be solely explained by the relative importance of migration in the 
countries in question. Overall, the search for migration-related terms in NAPAs conducted as 
part of the review revealed the following broad numerical trends: 
9 Despite the valuable lessons that emerged from Martin’s review, to date it lacks a definitive report outlining 
its findings. Instead, the review is summarised in a short briefing paper (Martin 2010a). 
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• Countries with ‘substantial’ discussion: ten NAPAs had 20 or more references for all 
search terms included in the review, with five countries having in excess of 35 
references; 
 Countries with ‘moderate’ discussion: 14 NAPAs had between ten and 19 total 
references for all search terms; 
 Countries with limited or negligible discussion: the remaining 21 NAPAs had fewer 
than nine overall references for all the search terms included in the review, with 
11 of these having five hits or fewer. 
Despite this wide range of discussion, the majority of NAPAs were characterised by one 
dominant perspective of migration that accounted for the majority of their migration 
discussion.10 Thus, we constructed a broad typology that accounts for the discussion of 
migration in NAPAs, based on the most often-cited migration-related topics in each 
NAPA. Importantly, these are not exclusive categories but rather are meant to illustrate 
the primary lens through which countries view human mobility in their NAPAs: 
Type 1 – Migration as a coping strategy: These NAPAs primarily discuss migration as a 
coping strategy, particularly in response to drought or other slow-onset climate changes 
that are occurring in the country, but also in some cases as a response to non-climatic 
factors such as a lack of employment opportunities. 
Type 2 – Displacement and resettlement: These NAPAs are preoccupied with population 
displacement, most frequently due to sea-level rise, flooding or landslides, with 
resettlement of communities often seen as the primary adaptive response to these 
impacts. Type 3 – Negative impacts of migration: These NAPAs emphasise the negative 
impacts of human mobility, including both climate-induced migration and other forms of 
migration, which is seen as contributing to environmental degradation, the spread of 
disease and pressure on urban infrastructure and services. 
Type 4 – Conflict-driven migration: A small group of NAPAs focus primarily on migration 
caused by civil conflict or wars in neighbouring countries and its impact on the 
adaptation context. 
The following sections will look at the ways in which NAPAs with different levels of 
migration discussion view migration issues. 
2.1 NAPAs with ‘substantial’ discussion of migration: mobility as a key variable in the 
adaption challenge 
Just ten NAPAs had more than 20 references to the review’s search terms (see Figure 2.1), 
and while these countries discussed migration in distinct ways, they shared an 
acknowledgement of the relevance of migration to their national adaptation context. Eight 
of the NAPAs in this sub-group were from African states, and six of the African countries, 
namely Chad, Mauritania, Togo, Eritrea, Sudan and Burkina Faso, were predominantly 
concerned with internal migration as a coping strategy in relation to drought – Type 1 in the 
10 Please refer to Appendix 1 for the full results of the review’s search for migration-related terms. Additionally, 
countries’ NAPA plans can be viewed at: 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/submitted_napas/items/4585.php> 
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 review typology (see Figure 2.2). These NAPAs typically discussed migration that was already 
occurring in response to recent droughts, especially with respect to rural herders’ increasing 
reliance on transhumance as a means to find pasture and water for livestock and rural 
farmers’ rural-urban or rural-rural migration in response to drought negatively impacting 
their harvests. By contrast, the island nations of Solomon Islands and Sao Tome and Principe 
fall into Type 2 of the review’s typology, as they were primarily preoccupied with issues of 
resettlement and displacement. The policy documents for Afghanistan and Uganda constitute 
relative outliers in the group of NAPAs with ‘substantial’ migration discussion, as the former 
was concerned primarily with conflict-driven migration (Type 4 in our typology) and the latter 
was primarily concerned with the negative impacts of migration (Type 3). 
The six African NAPAs in the Type 1 category did not discuss migration as a coping strategy in 
a completely uniform way, however. In Chad’s NAPA, for example, there are 14 references to 
transhumance, with herders’ seasonal migration being repeatedly mentioned as a traditional 
response to drought (Chad NAPA, 2010: vii-viii). In Mauritania’s NAPA, by contrast, the 
discussion revolves around rural exodus, which is mentioned 14 times. For example, the 
NAPA notes that as a result of an extended drought in the country during the 1970s and 
1980s, ‘formerly nomadic communities settled either in areas they considered most 
favourable (wetlands), or took part in a massive rural exodus to the main urban centres’ 
(Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 11). Similarly, Togo’s NAPA refers to rural exodus on 18 occasions, 
claiming that changes in the onset of the rainy season in the country have led to a range of 
impacts, including rural exodus and the seasonal migration of farmers (Togo NAPA, 2009: 30). 
The NAPAs for Eritrea, Sudan and Burkina Faso, meanwhile, all highlight the fact that 
transhumant migration constitutes an important coping strategy in the face of drought, with 
Sudan and Burkina Faso also noting that drought has seen rural agricultural producers 
relocate to areas with higher precipitation, or move to urban areas (Eritrea NAPA, 2007: 24; 
Sudan NAPA, 2007: 9; Burkina Faso NAPA, 2007: 22). 
Importantly, most of these countries do not have a wholly positive view of migration as a 
‘coping strategy’. For example, Chad’s NAPA sees climate change-induced migration as 
leading to competition for the best land (potentially leading to conflict), putting pressure on 
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Figure 2.1 NAPAs with 'substantial' discussion 
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 urban services and potentially leading to public health problems (Chad NAPA, 2010: 13; 27). 
Similarly, Mauritania’s NAPA links long-distance transhumance to the potential spread of 
contagious diseases and asserts that rural exodus in the country has contributed to the 
formation of disorderly suburban settlements (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 13; 70). In the case 
of Togo’s NAPA, the migration of farmers to new lands is linked to deforestation and the 
NAPA also claims that widespread rural exodus has created a range of problems including 
sanitation, land use issues and higher rates of unemployment (Togo NAPA, 2009: 19, 64). In 
a similar vein, Sudan’s NAPA links transhumant migration to an increase in conflict and the 
spread of disease (Sudan NAPA, 2007: 16, 30), while Burkina Faso claims that rural-to-rural 
migration leads to environmental degradation in receiving areas and that transhumance can 
contribute to a range of problems, including conflicts over natural resources (Burkina Faso 
NAPA, 2007: 4, 55). 
By contrast, the NAPAs for Solomon Islands and Sao Tome and Principe primarily discuss the 
resettlement or relocation of vulnerable low-lying communities. The NAPA for the Solomon 
Islands refers to relocation and resettlement a total of 28 times – by far the most of any 
NAPA – including discussion of a comprehensive evaluation plan which seeks to identify 
vulnerable communities and to resolve land tenure issues involved in relocation efforts 
(Solomon Islands NAPA, 2008: 86). The NAPA asserts that the islands are already 
experiencing the effects of climate change, as ‘a lot of coastal communities have moved two 
to three times...in the last 10 to 15 years, due to the intrusion of high seas and storm surges’ 
(Solomon Islands NAPA, 2008: 41). Similarly, Sao Tome and Principe’s NAPA notes that 
coastal erosion on the islands has already caused the displacement of some settlements and 
includes a priority project aimed at relocating three communities which are at-risk of 
flooding (Sao Tome and Principe NAPA, 2007: 21-22; 29). 
In Afghanistan’s NAPA, meanwhile, the primary focus is on conflict-related migration, with 
the document claiming that widespread internal and cross-border displacement caused by 
war has exacerbated the country’s adaptation challenges and contributed to environmental 
degradation. Displacement is seen as one of a range of issues that complicates land and 
resource property rights in the country and the return of refugees from abroad is perceived 
to be putting pressure on the agricultural resource base (Afghanistan NAPA, 2009: 18; 40). 
While Afghanistan’s NAPA mentions the historical importance of ethnic Kuchi herders’ 
















 the traditional migration routes of these herders have been interrupted by warfare 
(Afghanistan NAPA, 2009: 19). In Uganda’s NAPA, meanwhile, climate-induced migration is 
seen as having negative impacts, as it is linked to the incidence of conflict, environmental 
degradation and pressure on infrastructure. For example, the NAPA notes that in dry-land 
areas, out-migration has occurred in response to a lack of water resources, and that, ‘these 
movements have frequently led to ethnic conflicts and disruption of production, affecting 
the development of these communities’ (Uganda NAPA, 2007: 44). 
2.2 NAPAs with ‘moderate’ discussion of migration: accounting for mobility in adaptation 
strategies 
Although the manner in which this group of NAPAs discuss migration (see Figure. 2.3) is less 
comprehensive than their counterparts discussed in Section 2.1, a similar pattern emerges in 
terms of the issues which are most frequently discussed (see Figure 2.4). Eight of the 
countries from continental Sub-Saharan Africa in this grouping – Benin, Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Rwanda – fall into Type 1 of the 
review typology as they primarily discuss migration as a coping strategy for slow-onset 
climate change impacts, in particular drought and coastal erosion. Two island states, Tuvalu 
and Comoros, also fall into the Type 1 category, as they view internal migration and 
emigration as livelihood strategies that are predicated on high unemployment and a lack of 
opportunity on these islands. By contrast, three countries, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tanzania, 
fall into Type 2 of the review’s typology, as they are primarily concerned with issues of 
displacement or resettlement. Guinea, meanwhile, falls into Type 3 of our typology, as it 
mainly focuses on the negative impacts of migration, particularly with regard to 
environmental degradation caused by refugees. 
Once again, much of the discussion concerning migration as a coping strategy refers to 
migratory flows which are already occurring in many African countries. For instance, the 
NAPA for Gambia notes that poor rainfall distribution has contributed to poverty and food 
insecurity in rural areas, making the rural workforce more likely to migrate to cities in search 
of alternative, non-farm livelihoods (Gambia NAPA, 2008: 16). The policy document for 
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 Guinea-Bissau, meanwhile, highlights both the migration of farmers in response to rising 
salinity levels in mangrove rice fields and an increase in transhumance and rural exodus in 
response to drought (Guinea-Bissau NAPA, 2008: 32, 33, 42). Mali’s NAPA appears to be the 
lone NAPA – in any category – to directly link drought to international migration. It notes 
that there has been a significant amount of internal migration from the north of the country 
to the south and high rates of emigration to coastal countries in West Africa as well as to 
Europe (Mali NAPA, 2007: 34). The Central African Republic’s NAPA discusses increased 
reliance on transhumance due to drought (Central African Republic NAPA, 2008: 34-35), 
while Djibouti’s NAPA states that three-quarters of the country’s population now lives in 
urban areas, as the combination of recurrent drought and poor management of pastoral 
lands has helped to spawn a rural exodus, with many formerly nomadic groups settling 
around water points established by the state (Djibouti NAPA, 2006: 20). 
The NAPAs for Tuvalu and Comoros, meanwhile, are concerned primarily with migration 
that is occurring both internally and internationally, with a lack of employment 
opportunities – rather than climatic stress – being perceived as the main factor motivating 
these movements. The Tuvalu NAPA suggests that population growth in the capital, 
Funafuti, where 42 per cent of the population resides, is due to ‘high internal migration in 
search of employment’ (Tuvalu NAPA, 2007: 16). Emigration is linked in Tuvalu’s NAPA to 
low overall population growth, and remittances from overseas are noted as an important 
source of income in Funafuti and the outlying islands (Tuvalu NAPA, 2007: 15, 17). The 
NAPA for Comoros, meanwhile, notes the occurrence of both rural exodus and emigration, 
with the former linked in particular to soil degradation in rural areas and the latter seen as 
an outcome of weak economic diversity which will could limit the island state’s  response to 
climate change (Comoros NAPA, 2006: 10, 26). 
The three NAPAs which emphasise displacement or resettlement – Kiribati, Vanuatu and 
Tanzania – see population displacement caused by sea-level rise as the most pressing type of 
human mobility related to climate change adaptation. Vanuatu’s NAPA notes that the 
successful relocation of an at-risk community in the northern part of the country has already 
occurred, following an adaptation assessment and a campaign of public awareness (Vanuatu 
NAPA, 2007: 20). Kiribati’s NAPA also references past community resettlement, although it 
notes that this process led to ‘conflicting claims over resettled land’ (Kiribati NAPA, 2007: 11). 









Figure 2.4 'Moderate' discussion NAPAs: 






efforts (Vanuatu NAPA, 2007: 23-28; Kiribati NAPA, 2007: 59), although specific 
resettlement plans are not further elaborated in either of these policy documents. 
Tanzania’s NAPA, meanwhile, emphasises the possibility of sea-level rise contributing to 
coastal erosion that could displace vulnerable coastal communities (Tanzania NAPA, 2007: 
30). 
Guinea’s NAPA constitutes the primary outlier of the group of NAPAs with ‘moderate’ 
discussion of migration, as it mainly dwells on the negative impacts of migration. In 
particular, it links the presence of refugees in the country to environmental degradation 
(Guinea NAPA, 2007: 4) and asserts that over-exploitation of resources in the coastal area 
of the country could result in ‘population pressure’ precipitated by out-migration from this 
region, which could potentially lead to land-use conflict in other parts of the country 
(Guinea NAPA, 2007: e). The NAPA also claims that transhumance contributes both to the 
spread of disease and to conflicts between herders and farmers (Guinea NAPA, 2007: 19). 
2.3 Countries with ‘minimal’ discussion of migration: little consideration of the impact of 
mobility on adaptation 
This constitutes the largest sub-group of countries, with 21 of the 45 NAPAs referring to the 
migration-related terms included in the review fewer than ten times (see Figure 2.5). The 
lack of attention afforded to migration in this group of NAPAs is somewhat puzzling, 
particularly in Asian countries such as Bangladesh (seven overall references), Cambodia (two 
references), Lao PDR (one reference) and Nepal (one reference) – all of which are known to 
be major countries of the migration. This is perhaps most surprising in the case of 
Bangladesh, which has been widely acknowledged as being at acute risk of climate change, 
due to the large segment of its population that lives in low-lying coastal regions which are 
increasingly susceptible to flooding and salinization (Black, et al, 2008: 27). The relative 
neglect of migration issues in these four NAPAs also illustrates the policy disharmony 
between the NAPAs of these countries and their PRSPs and DWCPs – which in the case of 
each of these countries discuss migration to a significant degree (see Black and Sward, 2009; 
Deshingkar, et al., 2012). This would seem to give further weight to the criticism of NAPAs by 
the UNDP’s 2007/2008 Human Development Report – already mentioned in Section 1.1 – 
which suggests that they are at times developed in isolation from other national 
development planning processes (cited in Martin, 2010b: 401). 
Clearly, perceptions of migration in the sub-group of NAPAs with ‘minimal’ discussion of 
migration are less definitive than for the countries with ‘moderate’ and ‘substantial’ 
discussion of migration, owing to the fact that the discussion of migration in this final sub-
group is either limited or, in some cases, nearly non-existent. Nevertheless, the migration 
issues that are most commonly discussed in this group of NAPAs are interesting in that they 
diverge quite sharply from the types most frequently discussed in the preceding sections: 
Eight of the countries in this final group – Bhutan, Cape Verde, Malawi, Maldives, 
Mozambique, Samoa, Senegal, and Zambia – focus mainly on issues of displacement or 
relocation of communities (Type 2 in the review typology); five countries, including Ethiopia, 
Cambodia, Lesotho, Madagascar and Niger, view migration primarily as a coping strategy 
(Type 1); four countries – Bangladesh, Haiti, Nepal and Yemen – mainly highlight the negative 
impacts of migration (Type 3); while four countries – DR Congo, Lao PDR, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone – mainly discuss conflict-driven migration or issues related refugees (Type 
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 4). Thus, it is evident that relatively few countries view migration mainly as a coping strategy 
in this sub-group – despite that fact that this was the dominant view of migration in NAPAs 
with higher levels of migration discussion – whereas there are proportionally more countries 
that are primarily concerned with issues of resettlement and displacement, the negative 
impacts of migration or conflict-driven migration. 
3. Policy overview: migration in NAPA priority projects 
The ambivalent perception of migration in many NAPAs is perhaps most evident in the way 
that migration is incorporated into NAPAs’ proposed adaptation priority projects, which are 
designed to address countries’ immediate climate change adaptation needs. In fact, to the 
degree that autonomous modes of migration such as ‘rural exodus’ and ‘transhumance’ are 
actually discussed in these policy proposals, states seem determined to halt or reduce the 
need for such flows. Overall, as Figure 3.1 shows, 14 NAPAs propose priority projects that 
involve the resettlement of communities or address issues of displacement11; 13 NAPAs 
include priority projects that aim to limit rural out-migration (especially rural-urban 
exodus)12; nine NAPAs include priority projects related to transhumant migration13; three 
11 NAPAs that mention resettlement or displacement in their priority projects include Bhutan (2006), Gambia 
(2008), Haiti (2006), Maldives (2008), Mauritania (2004), Mozambique (2008), Rwanda (2007), Samoa (2005), 
Sao Tome and Principe (2007), Solomon Islands (2008), Tanzania (2007), Togo (2009), Tuvalu (2007) and 
Uganda (2007). 
12 NAPAs that mention limiting rural out-migration as part of their priority projects include Afghanistan (2009), 
Bangladesh (2005), Central African Republic (2008), Comoros (2006), Djibouti (2006), Mali (2007), Mauritania 
(2004), Rwanda (2007), Senegal (2006), Sudan (2007), Togo (2009), Uganda (2007) and Yemen (2009). 
13 NAPAs that include reference to transhumant herders in their priority projects include Burkina Faso (2007), 
Burundi (2007), Central African Republic (2008), Chad (2010), Eritrea (2007), Guinea (2007), Mauritania (2004), 
Rwanda (2007) and Sudan (2007). 
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Figure 2.5 NAPAs with 'minimal' discussion 
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NAPAs see migration as a threat to proposed priority projects14; two NAPAs seek to resolve 
public health or services issues related to migration15; and one NAPA incorporates conflict-
driven migration into its priority projects16. Some NAPAs include migration-related policies in 
more than one of these areas: For example, Mauritania’s NAPA has priority projects that fall 
into five of these sub-groupings. Meanwhile, 13 NAPAs do not include any mention of 
migration or related issues in their proposed priority projects17. 
This section will discuss each of these policy categories as they relate to the review’s typology 
of migration discussion (see Section 2). NAPA priority projects which deal with the theme of 
migration as a coping strategy (Type 1 in the review’s typology) thus include policies to limit 
rural out-migration and support transhumant herders through various policy interventions. 
Meanwhile, priority projects that refer to resettlement or displacement clearly match up with 
Type 2 in the review’s typology, which also focused on these issues. Policies which consider 
migration’s impact on health and services or see migration as a threat to proposed priority 
projects are consistent with Type 3 in the review’s typology – the negative impacts of 
migration. Finally, just one country – Sierra Leone – includes mention of conflict-driven 
migration, Type 4 in the review’s typology, illustrating the fact that although 
14 NAPAS that see migration as a threat to priority projects are Guinea-Bissau (2008), Mauritania (2007) and 
Niger (2006). 
15 NAPAs that seek to resolve health or services issues related to migration in their priority projects include 
Mauritania (2004) and Tuvalu (2007). 
16 The only NAPA that includes mention of conflict-driven migration in its priority projects is Sierra Leone 
(2008). 
17 NAPAs that do not mention migration in their priority projects include Benin (2008), Cambodia (2007), Cape 
Verde (2007), DR Congo (2006), Ethiopia (2008), Kiribati (2007), Lao PDR (2009), Lesotho (2007), Liberia (2007), 
Madagascar (2006), Malawi (2006), Vanuatu (2007) and Zambia (2007). 
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Figure 3.1 Migration in NAPA priority projects 
 
this was a commonly discussed theme in some NAPAs, this discussion was confined in 
most cases to the ‘country context’ section of these documents. 
3.1 Policies on ‘coping strategies’: limiting rural exodus and transhumance 
Negative views of rural migration have historically been common among developing country 
governments, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa (see for example Adebusoye 2006), so it 
is perhaps not surprising that limiting rural out-migration is a common feature of many 
NAPAs from this region. Furthermore, the LDC Expert Group’s published guidelines for the 
preparation of NAPAs actually endorse such policies, suggesting that ‘investments in fragile 
and marginalized areas sensitive to climate change’ can help to reduce rural-urban migration 
(LEG, 2002: 27). However, there is little evidence to support this claim, as historically 
speaking the vast majority of policy efforts to limit rural out-migration across the developing 
world have generally failed in all but the short term (Skeldon 2009: 12). Policies which seek 
to keep rural residents ‘on the farm’ also ignore the positive role that migration can play in 
diversifying rural livelihood strategies and making households more resilient to 
environmental change, as discussed in Section 1.218. 
Ten out of the 13 countries that discuss limiting rural out-migration in their NAPA priority 
projects are in Africa (see footnote 12). Mauritania’s NAPA cites limiting rural exodus as part 
of the rationale for a range of the adaptation measures it proposes, including the 
introduction of drought-resistant cereal production (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 54), the 
establishment of water-saving irrigation (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 55-56) and the 
improvement of farming techniques (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 57). Similarly, Sudan’s NAPA 
seeks to halt rural exodus through a programme to revive gum arabic trees (Sudan NAPA, 
2007: 43) and by introducing water harvesting methods in rural areas (Sudan NAPA, 2007: 
45). In the same vein, Mali’s priority projects aim to decrease the on-going rural exodus in the 
country through the establishment of fish-raising practices in rural areas (Mali NAPA, 2007: 
53), the use of meteorological forecasts to assist in agricultural production (Mali NAPA, 2007: 
57) and by extending micro-credit programs to women and youth who remain in rural areas 
after other family members have migrated (Mali NAPA, 2007: 50). 
Similarly, the NAPAs for Togo and Senegal propose projects aimed at benefitting the 
agriculture sector in order to reduce rural exodus. Togo’s NAPA calls for the development of 
irrigation systems and gardening practices in rural areas in an attempt to halt rural exodus 
(Togo NAPA, 2009: 102), while Senegal’s NAPA also calls for the establishment of irrigation 
systems in order to offset the country’s increasingly erratic rainy season, with the aim of 
decreasing the rural exodus of farmers (Senegal NAPA, 2006: 53). The NAPA for Central 
African Republic, meanwhile, proposes that rural employment could be generated through 
harvesting waste products from commercial logging operations, which could help to stem 
rural exodus (Central African Republic NAPA, 2008: 60). Similarly, the NAPAs for Djibouti, 
Rwanda and Uganda all discuss land conservation or rehabilitation projects in order to slow 
rural out-migration (Djibouti NAPA, 2006: 67, 68; Rwanda NAPA, 2007: 37; Uganda NAPA, 
18 This is not to say that governments shouldn’t invest in rural areas, but rather that there is little evidence that 
such investment will stop migration. 
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2007: 53). The NAPA for Comoros, meanwhile, claims that constructing low-cost housing in 
rural areas will limit rural exodus (Comoros NAPA, 2006: 76). 
A handful of NAPAs for countries outside Africa also employ this policy logic, as the NAPAs for 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Yemen all include priority projects designed in part to slow rural 
out-migration. Bangladesh’s NAPA includes priority projects that seek to prevent salinization 
and flooding (Bangladesh NAPA, 2005: 35-36; 37) in order to help stem rural-urban migration 
and ‘reduce the social problems of migration of the distressed community to cities’ 
(Bangladesh NAPA, 2005: 37). Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s NAPA includes a priority project on 
improved water management that cites drought forcing families to migrate to urban areas as 
part of its rationale (Afghanistan NAPA, 2009: 80). Similarly, a priority project in Yemen’s 
NAPA aims to rehabilitate and maintain mountain terraces in order to slow out-migration 
from agricultural areas (Yemen NAPA, 2009: 42). 
The nine NAPAs that make reference to transhumant migration in their priority projects, 
meanwhile, are all from continental Africa (see footnote 13), underlining the fact that 
pastoral movements remain an important livelihood activity in many African LDCs. While all 
of these countries have more or less ‘supportive’ stances towards transhumance, the policies 
they propose for the most part seek to reduce or eliminate the need for this type of 
migration. Chad’s NAPA is a case in point, as it includes priority projects that aim to create 
water points along traditional transhumance routes (Chad NAPA, 2010: 41), improve 
communal grazing lands in order to decrease the need for long-distance transhumance (Chad 
NAPA, 2010: 51) and establish fodder banks to prevent the large-scale displacement of 
herders (Chad NAPA, 2010: 57). Similarly, Eritrea’s NAPA calls for the improvement of 
rangeland productivity in order to reduce herders’ reliance on long-distance moves (Eritrea 
NAPA, 2007: 29) and aims to encourage pastoral groups to adopt drought-resistant animals, 
such as sheep and goats (Eritrea NAPA, 2007: 32). The latter policy is echoed verbatim in a 
priority project introduced in Guinea’s NAPA (2007: 68), indicating the cross-pollination of 
policy approached across some NAPAs. 
Sudan’s NAPA, meanwhile, includes priority projects which seek to create water catchments 
to decrease the need for transhumant migration in search of water and pasture (Sudan 
NAPA, 2007: 39) and to prevent the further deterioration of pastoral rangelands (Sudan 
NAPA, 2007: 43). Similarly, Burkina Faso’s NAPA seeks to support transhumant herders and 
make them less reliant on pastoral migration through a priority project that aims to stockpile 
feed for livestock (Burkina Faso NAPA, 2007: 43-44). The NAPA also includes a priority 
project that seeks to secure pastoral land in the Sahel in order to limit the need for cross-
border or internal transhumance (Burkina Faso NAPA, 2007: 52). The remaining NAPAs that 
discuss policies related to transhumance propose similar solutions: for example, Burundi’s 
NAPA encourages the agricultural production of fodder for livestock in order to limit the 
need for transhumance (Burundi NAPA, 2007: 52); the Central African Republic’s NAPA seeks 
to rehabilitate vegetation in pastoral areas (Central African Republic NAPA, 2008: 56); 
Mauritania’s NAPA seeks to promote livestock mobility through the provision of support to 
nomadic herders (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 45-47); and Rwanda’s NAPA includes a 
conservation programme designed to prevent soil erosion in order to reduce the need for 
the migration of herders (Rwanda NAPA, 2007: 37). While these policies seek to support 
transhumant communities, attempts to control the movement of herders may in fact make 
them more vulnerable to shifts in climate. 
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3.2 Policies on resettlement and displacement 
Despite the fact that many island states are facing the prospect of drastic resettlement and 
displacement in the coming decades, paradoxically half of the NAPAs (seven of the 14) that 
include mention of these issues in their priority projects are located in continental Africa (see 
footnote 11). Additionally, three Pacific Island Countries fall into this category, as do the 
island states of Haiti, Maldives and Sao Tome and Principe. Bhutan represents an outlier as 
the lone land-locked Asian state to mention resettlement in its NAPA priority projects. 
In the case of the seven continental African NAPAs in this category, resettlement is often 
viewed as a viable way to address the risks faced by ‘vulnerable’ communities, while other 
policies seek to enact preventive measures to avoid future population displacement. For 
example, Uganda’s NAPA includes a measure to assess the ‘need to relocate communities at 
risk of flooding and landslides to safer districts’ (Uganda NAPA, 2007: 56), while Tanzania’s 
NAPA calls for the ‘relocation of vulnerable communities in low-lying areas’ as part of one of 
its priority projects (Tanzania NAPA, 2007: ix). In a different vein, the NAPA for Gambia notes 
that a priority project which calls for the rehabilitation of a river basin will involve the 
displacement of current residents and mentions the need to provide compensation as part 
of these resettlement efforts (Gambia NAPA, 2008: 82). Togo’s NAPA, meanwhile, calls for 
the establishment of an early warning system for floods in both the savannah and coastal 
regions of the country, citing the need to prevent excessive displacement of the population 
as part of the rationale for this project (Togo NAPA, 2009: 92). Similarly, Rwanda’s NAPA 
proposes the creation of a National Plan for Disaster Management, including a protocol for 
looking after displaced populations following environmental catastrophes (Rwanda NAPA, 
2007: 19). 
Unsurprisingly, the NAPAs for the PICs and other island nations are by-and-large preoccupied 
with resettlement as a result of rising sea levels. A prominent example of this is the NAPA for 
the Solomon Islands, which calls for the creation of a relocation plan for vulnerable 
communities on low-lying or artificially built up islands (Solomon Islands NAPA, 2008: 85-87). 
Similarly, Samoa’s NAPA proposes the ‘incremental relocation of community and 
government assets’ to areas outside Coastal Hazard Zones as one of its priority projects 
(Samoa NAPA, 2005: 48-49). The NAPA for the Maldives, meanwhile, includes a priority 
project which aims to help communities adapt to rising sea levels through the strengthening 
of its Safer Island Strategy, which it developed in 2004 to resettle communities from smaller, 
more vulnerable islands to larger, better protected ones (Maldives NAPA, 2008: 47, 50). And 
the NAPA for Sao Tome and Principe aims to relocate three communities that are vulnerable 
to flooding and landfalls (Sao Tome and Principe NAPA, 2007: 48), while Haiti’s NAPA calls 
for the relocation of an unplanned coastal community outside Port-au-Prince which is 
primarily home to recent rural-urban migrants (Haiti NAPA, 2006: 43). The NAPA states that 
the construction of this settlement has resulted in the loss of mangroves and that the 
community is vulnerable to flooding and contributes to water pollution because of sanitation 
issues (Haiti NAPA, 2006: 43).19 
19 For an in-depth analysis of the potential problems linked to adopting such resettlement schemes as part of 
climate change adaptation efforts, see McDowell, 2011. 
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3.3 Policies on the ‘negative impacts’ of climate-related migration 
As was mentioned at the start of this section, a small number of NAPAs attempt to resolve 
health or services issues related to migration in their priority projects (see footnotes 14 and 
15). For example, Mauritania’s NAPA includes a project that refers to the need to create 
orderly settlements in suburban areas that have become heavily populated due to rural 
exodus (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 70). Tuvalu’s NAPA, meanwhile, suggests that internal 
migration to urban areas has led to water shortages, which it cites as part of  the rationale 
for a proposed urban water conservation project (Tuvalu NAPA, 2007: 45). Additionally, 
some NAPAs explicitly list various types of migration as a threat to priority projects that 
they propose in their policy documents. For example, Mauritania’s NAPA views rural exodus 
as a risk to a range of priority projects planned for rural areas, including water catchment 
(Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 58), installation of drip irrigation in river valleys and oasis zones 
(Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 60), and the construction of flood deceleration gates (Mauritania 
NAPA, 2004: 61) and electronic water pumps (Mauritania NAPA, 2004: 62). This is 
presumably because rural out-migration could lessen the need for these projects. Similarly, 
Niger’s NAPA suggests that a priority project which seeks to build the capacity of rural 
producers could be jeopardised by the mobility of some parties who are targets of the 
project (Niger NAPA, 2006: 69). The NAPA for Guinea-Bissau, meanwhile, identifies conflicts 
between farmers and herders caused by transhumant migration as one of the perceived 
risks to a project that would bring irrigation systems to rural areas (Guinea-Bissau NAPA, 
2008: 73). 
3.4 Beyond climate migration: policies on conflict-driven migration and NAPAs which ignore 
migration issues 
The lone NAPA to propose a priority project explicitly related to conflict-driven migration is 
Sierra Leone’s NAPA, which includes an HIV/AIDS prevention programme which is aimed in 
part at refugees and internally displaced persons, with these groups being seen as at-risk of 
infection (Sierra Leone NAPA, 2008: 102-103). Although conflict-driven migration is widely 
discussed in the NAPAs of many post-conflict states, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa, clearly 
this is not an issue that many countries have incorporated into their immediate adaptation 
strategies. Significantly, 13 NAPAs – nearly one-third of all NAPAs – make no mention of 
migration in their proposed priority projects (see footnote 17). Not surprisingly, these 13 
countries are among those that contain little overall discussion of migration in their NAPAs: 
Just three of these countries (Benin, Kiribati and Vanuatu) have ten or more references to the 
migration-related terms included in the review, while the remainder fall into the category of 
‘minimal discussion’ analysed in Section 2. 
4. Case study: migration and adaptation in West Africa 
In all, ten West African states have completed NAPAs – Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The extent to which migration 
was discussed in these countries’s NAPAs varied: the NAPAs for Togo and Burkina Faso had 
the most robust discussion of migration with more than 20 overall references to the review’s 
search terms; the NAPAs for Benin, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, had ‘moderate’ 
discussion of migration, with between ten and 19 references to the review’s migration-
related search terms; while the NAPAs for Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone had 
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‘minimal’ discussion of migration, with less than ten references to migration and related 
issues. This case study will provide background context on climate-change related migration 
in the region, before providing analysis of three commonly referenced migration-related 
themes in West African NAPAs. These are: (1) increased transhumance and rural exodus in 
response to drought affecting agricultural and pastoral activities; (2) sea-level rise and 
flooding leading to potential population displacement and/or the resettlement of at-risk 
communities; and (3) negative impacts associated with human mobility, including 
environmental degradation, pressure on urban services and links between migration and 
disease. In conclusion, the case study identifies some of the gaps in the discussion of 
migration in West African NAPAs. 
4.1 Migration and climate change: the West African context 
Before the era of colonialism in West Africa the majority of migration took place for 
reasons of basic security, trade, and the search for fertile arable land to be used for 
farming and subsequently for settlements (Skinner, 1963; Boahen, 1966; Brand, 1972; 
Sutton, 1983; Anderson and Rathbone, 2000). However, colonialism brought in its wake 
new political and economic structures – notably the introduction of tax regimes and the 
establishment of new territorial boundaries. In addition, colonial recruitment policies, 
such as compulsory recruitment as well as contract and forced labour legislation, brought 
about labour migration, particularly from Mali, Togo and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) to 
plantations and mines in Gold Coast (Ghana) and Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) (Hill, 1961; 
Nabila, 1972; Peil, 1974; McEvoy, 1977; Stock, 2004). The massive transportation network 
that was developed within the West African sub-region facilitated this migration process 
during the colonial period (Adepoju, 2005). Patterns of migration in recent times in the 
sub-region are therefore rooted in socio-economic, political and historical-cultural factors 
which have helped to shape development and economic activities in West Africa and are 
particularly relevant in the case of international migration (Adepoju, 2005). 
In recent times, climate change has posed an increasingly recognizable threat to the 
employment and wellbeing of many West Africans. In agricultural areas, particularly in the 
arid Sahel region, drought and changes in precipitation have contributed to the 
deterioration of rural economies, which is reflected in declining incomes, malnutrition and 
hunger (Harthill, 2008). The degradation of soil and water resources and the escalation of 
droughts and floods have led to the overestimation of agricultural yields and profits. 
Realization of such, in many cases, has resulted in farming families sending one or more of 
their barely-adult offspring to the more resource-rich south, first to reduce the pressure of 
mouths to feed but also with the anticipation that these migrants may be able to generate 
remittances to send home to their families in the Sahel – a common livelihood strategy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Bryceson, 2009). In other instances, these migrations have been to 
international destinations. In a related development, although patterns of migration and 
transhumance of Fulani herdsmen from the Sahel to the Savannah zone of Africa have 
existed for centuries, there is evidence that the phenomenon is increasing in recent times 
(Tonah, 2000). This can potentially be attributed to shifts in agro-ecological zones, in other 
words a southward expansion of the Sudan savannah as a result of climatic changes. Such a 
shift does not only alter growing conditions for crops and pastures but can also bring in its 
wake tensions between farmers and herders as they struggle over scarce resources (Fasona 
and Omojola, 2005; Obioha, 2005). 
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4.2 Theme one: increased transhumance and rural exodus in response to drought 
This is the migration issue that attracts the most overall discussion in West African NAPAs: 
Eight of the ten countries in the region discuss this theme to some degree, and four of the 
five NAPAs with the most overall migration discussion in the region (Togo, Burkina Faso, 
Guinea Bissau and Mali) discuss this theme substantively. For example, the NAPA for Togo 
widely discusses rural migration and drought, claiming that drought and changes in the onset 
of the rainy season have led to rural exodus and the seasonal migration of farmers (Togo 
NAPA, 2009: 30). The NAPA predicts that future climate change impacts in the agricultural 
sector could include a decrease in agricultural yields and an increase in the severity of pests 
and diseases, potentially changing current patterns of arable land use and spawning further 
rural exodus (Togo NAPA, 2009: 38). Meanwhile, the NAPA for Burkina Faso observes that 
transhumance, which was once unknown in many areas of the country, is now widespread 
due to recurring drought (Burkina Faso NAPA, 2007: 4). While this type of migration is noted 
as a coping mechanism (Burkina Faso NAPA, 2007: 20), it has also created a range of 
problems, according to the NAPA, including conflicts over natural resources and the death of 
livestock during long-distance journeys (Burkina Faso NAPA, 2007: 55). 
The relationship between drought and human mobility is also acknowledged in other West 
African NAPAs, which typically cite patterns of migration which are already occurring. The 
NAPA for Gambia claims that ‘poor intra-seasonal rainfall distribution’ has decreased food 
security, rural poverty and hardship, which has lead many young people from rural areas to 
migrate to urban areas in search of alternative, non-farm employment (Gambia NAPA, 2008: 
16). Similarly, in Guinea’s NAPA transhumance during the dry season is seen as constituting 
part of a set of existing practices that make up endogenous knowledge of adaptation in the 
country (Guinea NAPA, 2007: 24). However, the Guinean NAPA nonetheless views herders as 
one of the groups at risk because of climate change, as it predicts that climate change will 
lead to the reduction of livestock numbers due to a decrease in grazing areas and the 
proliferation of disease (Guinea NAPA, 2007: 19). The NAPA also predicts that increased 
reliance on transhumance and more frequent conflicts between farmers and herders are 
possible outcomes of climate change in the country (Guinea NAPA, 2007: 19). 
Similarly, the NAPA for Guinea-Bissau notes that a decrease in rainfall combined with a rise 
in temperatures has negatively impacted the availability of grazing land and water points, 
leading to transhumance becoming more widespread (Guinea-Bissau NAPA, 2008: 33). 
Furthermore, the NAPA perceives ‘rural exodus’ to be one of the potential impacts of 
drought in the coming years (Guinea-Bissau NAPA, 2008: 43). This discussion is mirrored in 
Mali’s NAPA, which observes that persistent drought since the 1970s has resulted in 
migration becoming an important strategy for many rural inhabitants in the face of 
increasingly precarious environmental conditions (Mali NAPA, 2007: 11). The NAPA argues 
that migration has been a spontaneous reaction to drought, with many Malians moving to 
urban centres, other West African countries or Europe in order to find work and send back 
money to families who remain behind (Mali NAPA, 2007: 34). Meanwhile, the NAPAs for 
Benin and Senegal also discuss transhumance or rural exodus in response to drought 
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although both documents focus on the perceived negative impacts of these types of 
migration20. 
4.3 Theme two: sea-level rise, flooding and population displacement 
Eight of the ten West African countries’ NAPAs also include some level of discussion on this 
migration-related theme – although it is not discussed in the same depth as migration related 
to drought. Unquestionably, sea-level rise is a significant issue in the region because many of 
West Africa’s largest cities, including Lagos, Accra, Abidjan, Conakry, etc., are located on 
fragile coasts or river deltas. Thus a great deal of the region’s economic, social and political 
infrastructure is concentrated in at-risk coastal areas, underlining the need for the protection 
of these zones. Populations in these locations are highly vulnerable to sea-level rise, coastal 
erosion and increasing salinity in water tables. Furthermore, in a number of countries in the 
region sea-level rise and coastal erosion are already occurring and these impacts in some 
cases present an immediate threat to coastal populations. 
The issue of sea-level rise leading to displacement or resettlement in coastal areas is 
mentioned in the NAPAs for the West African countries of Togo, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guinea, Benin, Sierra Leone and Senegal. The issue is discussed most substantively in the 
Senegal NAPA, which claims that coastal erosion is threatening nearly every major coastal city 
in the country (Senegal NAPA, 2006: 22). In fact, the NAPA notes that coastal erosion has 
resulted in the relocation of several coastal communities that were displaced after being 
damaged by strong waves (Senegal NAPA, 2006: 55). The other West African NAPAs, by 
contrast, are more concerned with the prospect of future sea-level rise. For example, Togo’s 
NAPA notes that rising sea levels is expected to result in coastal erosion and thus the future 
displacement of coastal settlements (Togo NAPA, 2009: 2). Meanwhile, the NAPAs for 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Benin and Sierra Leone, respectively, identify resettlement of 
coastal communities as a potential future adaptation measure in response to sea-level rise 
but stop short of including it in their immediate adaptation activities (Gambia NAPA, 2008: 
47; Guinea-Bissau NAPA, 2008: 44; Guinea NAPA, 2007: 14; Benin NAPA, 2008: 60; Sierra 
Leone NAPA, 2008: 24). 
Additionally, four West African NAPAs note that human settlements are currently at-risk of 
flooding or refer to severe flooding that has occurred in recent years that has led to the 
displacement of populations. For example, Togo’s NAPA notes that flooding in 2007 caused 
widespread damage and displaced an estimated 34,000 people (Togo DWCP, 2009: 29). 
Meanwhile, Mali’s NAPA identifies the relocation of populations who live in ‘flood disaster 
areas’ to more appropriate sites as a possible adaptation activity, although this is not taken 
up in the NAPA’s priority projects (Mali NAPA, 2007: 35). Similarly, Benin’s NAPA notes that 
20 For example, Benin’s NAPA sees rural exodus as an unsustainable existing adaptation measure to climatic 
stress and asserts that transhumance (which is occurring on a large-scale in the country because of drought) has 
led to significant conflicts between herders and farmers (Benin NAPA, 2008: 49, 27). The Senegalese NAPA, 
meanwhile, recognises that the rural poor are likely the most vulnerable group to climate change impacts such 
as drought and that one of their primary coping strategies is rural exodus to cities, which it claims leads to 
problems in urban areas (Senegal NAPA, 2006: 61). 
29 
displacement due to flooding is one of several climate change impacts expected to affect 
the country (Benin NAPA, 2008: 60). Finally, Senegal’s NAPA observes that the annual 
rainy season typically results in damage to infrastructure and homes, often necessitating 
the temporary relocation of affected populations (Senegal NAPA, 2006: 22). 
4.4 Theme three: negative impacts associated with migration 
Seven of the ten West African NAPAs refer to the negative impacts of migration, reflecting 
the fact that governments’ perceptions of migration in the region remain ambivalent, at 
best. Although Togo’s NAPA refers to internal migration as a coping strategy in the face of 
climatic stress (Togo NAPA, 2009: 46, 47), it also claims that widespread rural exodus could 
lead to a range of problems in urban areas, including sanitation and land use issues, security 
problems and higher rates of unemployment (Togo NAPA, 2009: 64). Senegal’s NAPA 
repeats verbatim the Togolese NAPA’s argument about rural exodus potentially putting 
pressure on urban areas, citing the same issues as points of concern (Senegal NAPA, 2006: 
61). Meanwhile, Guinea’s NAPA claims that rural exodus will contribute to ‘population 
pressure’ in the country, although it does not elaborate beyond this vague statement 
(Guinea NAPA, 2007: e). Furthermore, three West African NAPAs link migration to the 
spread of disease. Gambia’s NAPA claims that the mobility of populations both in the 
country’s coastal zone and along the Trans-Gambia route contribute to risk of infectious 
disease outbreaks (Gambia NAPA, 2008: 21, 25). Meanwhile, Guinea’s NAPA links 
transhumant migration to the spread of disease (Guinea NAPA 2007: 19) and a HIV/AIDS 
prevention programme mentioned in Sierra Leone’s NAPA targets refugees and internally 
displaced persons on the basis that these groups are particularly vulnerable to infection 
(Sierra Leone NAPA, 2008: 102-103). 
Additionally, two West African NAPAs link migration to environmental degradation. Burkina 
Faso’s NAPA claims that people who have migrated because of drought in the country have 
contributed to environmental degradation at their places of reception (Burkina Faso NAPA, 
2007: 4). Meanwhile, Guinea’s NAPA asserts that the prolonged stay of refugees in the 
country is one factor, in addition to cattle ranching and logging, that has contributed to the 
deforestation (Guinea NAPA, 2007: 4). By contrast, Liberia’s NAPA focuses on the impact of 
conflict-driven displacement in the country during its civil war21, which caused widespread 
disruption to the agrarian sector (Liberia NAPA, 2008: 20). The NAPA notes that, ‘There was 
widespread population displacement, particularly the rural one into IDPs’ and refugees’ 
camps. Farms and equipment were abandoned and looted, with livestock either killed or 
looted by fighters of the civil war’ (Liberia NAPA, 2008: 20). 
4.5 Gaps in the migration discussion in West African NAPAs 
Considered as a group, there are some notable gaps in West African NAPAs’ discussion of 
migration. Firstly, migration due to flooding is a rather marginalised topic of discussion in 
the NAPAs produced by Sahelian countries such as Mali, Niger, Senegal and Mauritania. 
However, the region has experienced instances of flooding due to heavy rainfall in recent 
21 Fourteen years of civil war in Liberia formally ended in August 2003 with the flight into exile of former 
President Charles Taylor (Bøås 2005: 73). 
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years and the latest scientific projections suggest that there is more to come (Christiansen, 
et al., 2007). While there remains a lack of scientific consensus regarding the affect climate 
change will have on the Sahel, there is recent data on a possible increase in rainfall 
(Nicholson, et al., 2000; Nicholson, 2005) and debates on the ‘greening’ of the Sahel based 
on remotely sensed vegetation values and improved soil and water conservation 
(Rasmussen, et al., 2001; Olsson, et al., 2005; Herrmann, et al., 2005), as well as speculation 
regarding a potential shift to substantially wetter periods (Ozer, et al., 2002; Hubert, et al., 
2005). Additionally, the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (Christiansen, et al., 2007) 
projects that high intensity rainfall events and associated flooding in West Africa are 
expected to increase by 20 per cent in the coming decades. Despite this emerging body of 
evidence, the long-standing ‘desertification narrative’ is still predominantly used to 
understand the Sahelian landscape, of which drought constitutes the quintessential core 
(Tschakert, et al., 2010). The tendency of this narrative to over-emphasise the significance of 
drought and to under-represent the threat posed by flooding is to a certain extent mirrored 
by West African NAPAs’ discussion of climate-induced migration. 
Secondly, in recent years female migrants – including unaccompanied married females – 
have been drawn to the wage labour market (both formal and informal) as a livelihood 
strategy to supplement dwindling family income (Adepoju, 2000). Thus, traditional, male-
dominated migratory streams in West Africa are increasingly being complemented by 
female migration. Another form of migration on the increase in the sub-region is the 
migration of independent child migrants and trafficked children (Frempong-Ainguah, et al., 
2010). Flows of child migration have been documented from Togo, Nigeria and Mali to Côte 
d’Ivoire, where children often work on plantations or as domestic servants (Adepoju, 2005), 
and from rural parts of Ghana to the capital of Accra (Kwankye, et al., 2009). These 
phenomena could become more common in response to climate change as sources of rural 
employment continue to dwindle. The review shows that West African NAPAs do not 
account for how climate change will affect these existing migration patterns. 
5. Policy implications 
Based on the findings of the Migration RPC’s review of migration in NAPAs, there are at 
least three key policy lessons that would enable NAPAs to mainstream issues related to 
migration and human mobility into proposed adaptation activities: 
Firstly, following Huq and Khan (2006), we suggest that the adoption of a livelihood-based 
approach – as opposed to a sector-based approach – would be a first step towards ensuring 
that NAPAs benefit vulnerable groups, including migrants. A livelihood-based approach to 
adaptation that considers migration to be an integral part of many rural livelihood strategies 
– as opposed to migration being merely an ad hoc reaction to climatic stress – is essential in 
order to create adaptation strategies which do not risk further disenfranchising poor migrants 
in LDCs. While some NAPAs seem to recognise that migration is an endogenous coping 
strategy in response to climatic stress, the policies proposed in NAPAs generally seek to 
reduce migration flows, which could possibly have negative repercussions for migrants who 
move because of interconnected climatic, economic and social factors. 
Secondly, there is a need to build capacity in LDCs to enable governments to adequately 
cope with the pressures of rural-to-urban migration. Too often policies focus on attempting 
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to limit rural exodus, but while economic or climatic factors arguably contribute to these 
flows, other factors such as changing expectations of rural youth and new off-farm 
employment opportunities for young women are also important factors that encourage 
internal migration in some countries (see for example Tacoli and Mabala, 2010). Despite 
the potential benefits that rural-urban migration may bring for migrants and their families, 
such migrants may also face significant risks, including lack access to adequate housing, 
health services and formal social protection. As many cities in developing countries are 
likely to be at-risk of flooding and sea-level rise in the coming decades, policies that address 
issues of rural-urban migrants’ vulnerability are a potentially vital aspect to adaptation 
efforts in urban areas. This is particularly important as many informal or illegal settlements 
in urban centres, which are often home to recent migrants, lack proper drainage and 
sanitation infrastructure (Satterthwaite, 2011: 1778) and are thus particularly at-risk to 
flooding and related health risks. Simply removing or relocating these settlements is likely 
to negatively affect the economic and social situations of current residents, and 
governments and donors alike need to reach durable solutions which make such urban 
areas more resilient to climate threats. 
Thirdly, there is a need to better integrate NAPAs into national poverty reduction strategies 
and other development frameworks, as adaptation needs and poverty reduction targets are 
likely to increasingly overlap in the coming years. As was mentioned in Section 2.3, there is a 
significant amount of policy disharmony between some countries’ NAPAs and PRSPs, 
particularly in the case of NAPAs submitted by several Asian LDCs. Both national poverty 
reduction strategies and NAPAs would benefit from employing a new, more balanced 
perspective of migration. Under the right conditions, migration can contribute to both 
poverty reduction and climate change adaptation, but many states continue to employ a 
negative view of migration as being a symptom of failed development or a barrier to 
adaptation. 
In conclusion, while many NAPAs do acknowledge the importance of migration as a coping 
strategy, they seem to be unsure of how to integrate such migratory flows into their climate 
change adaptation plans. Rather than viewing migration solely as a problem to be solved, 
migration should be appreciated as being a potentially important adaptive practice in many 
LDCs. However, the projected impacts of climate change – ranging from long-running 
droughts to sudden floods – are diverse and are likely to influence migration trends in distinct 
ways, demanding different policy responses in different country contexts. In sum, the types 
of migration that are likely to emerge due to climate change will not be uniform, but rather 
disaster- and location-specific. Broadly speaking, in the case of slow-onset climate change 
impacts governments and international agencies should attempt to find positive ways to 
engage with migrants who are affected by these changing realities, rather than simply 
introducing measures which attempt to stop migration flows. On the other hand, the 
prospect of increased storm intensity, flooding and other natural disasters highlights the need 
to ensure the safety of those who are displaced with little warning. 
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7. Appendix: Full Review Results 
Note to readers: resettle* was not included in results for French-language NAPAs due to 
the lack of a satisfactory translation for this term. 




Afghanistan 2009 END 16 U 3 U 7 U U 
Bangladesh 2005 END 5 2 U U U U U 
Benin 2008 FRA 2 1 U 2 1 U* U 
Bhutan 2006 END 1 U U U U 5 1 
Burkina Faso 2007 FRA 6 2 U 1 1 U* U 
Burundi 2007 FRA/END 4 1 U U 4 U U 
Cambodia 2007 END 1 1 U U U U U 
Cape Verde 2007 END 1 U U 3 3 U U 
Central African Republic 2008 FRA 6 U U 1 U U* U 
Chad 2010 FRA 14 5 U 3 5 U* U 
Comoros 2006 FRA/END 6 1 U 3 U U U 
DR Congo 2006 FRA U U U 2 3 U* U 
Djibouti 2006 FRA 4 U U 5 U U* U 
Eritrea 2007 END 2 9 U U 2 3 2 
Ethiopia 2008 END 4 U U U 2 1 U 
Dambia 2008 END 9 U 3 U 1 4 U 
Duinea 2007 FRA 1 U 1 1 1 U* U 
Duinea-Bissau 2008 END 3 3 U 2 2 U U 
Haiti 2006 FRA 4 1 U U U U* U 
Kiribati 2007 END 2 1 U U U 4 3 
Lao PDR 2009 END U U U U U 1 U 
Lesotho 2007 END 3 U U U U U U 
Liberia 2007 END U U U U 5 1 U 
Madagascar 2006 FRA 2 U U U U U* U 
Malawi 2006 END U U U U 1 3 U 
Maldives 2008 END U U 1 U U 3 U 
Mali 2007 FRA 8 U 2 4 1 U* U 
Mauritania 2004 FRA/END 1 9 14 14 U U 1 
Mozambique 2008 END 2 U U U 3 2 1 
Nepal 2010 END 2 U U U U U U 
Niger 2006 FRA/END U 1 1 U U U U 
Rwanda 2007 FRA/END 7 1 U U 2 U U 
Samoa 2005 END 1 U U U U U 6 
Sao Tome and Principe 2007 END 1 1 U U 7 U 12 
Senegal 2006 FRA U U U 2 1 U* 3 
Sierra Leone 2008 END U U U U 4 U U 
Solomon Islands 2008 END 2 7 2 U 2 4 24 
Sudan 2007 END 12 1 1 U 7 1 1 
Tanzania 2007 END 2 1 U U 1 U 6 
Togo 2009 FRA 2 U U 18 16 U* U 
Tuvalu 2007 END 7 U U U U 3 U 
Uganda 2007 END 12 3 U U 6 U 1 
Vanuatu 2007 END U U U U U U 1U 
Yemen 2009 END 1 U U U U U U 
Zambia 2007 END U U U U 3 U U 
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Full results continued: 
Country year border refugee circula* transhuman* return remit* Total 
Afghanistan 2009 0 4 0 2 3 0 35 
Bangladesh 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Benin 2008 0 0 0 5 0 0 11 
Bhutan 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Burkina Faso 2007 0 0 0 11 0 0 21 
Burundi 2007 0 0 0 1 1 0 11 
Cambodia 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Cape Verde 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Central African Republic 2008 0 0 0 7 0 0 14 
Chad 2010 0 0 0 14 0 0 41 
Comoros 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
DR Congo 2006 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Djibouti 2006 0 2 0 2 0 0 13 
Eritrea 2007 0 3 0 0 1 5 27 
Ethiopia 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Gambia 2008 1 0 0 1 0 0 19 
Guinea 2007 0 3 0 8 0 0 15 
Guinea-Bissau 2008 0 0 0 8 0 0 18 
Haiti 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Kiribati 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Lao PDR 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lesotho 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Liberia 2007 0 3 0 0 0 0 9 
Madagascar 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Malawi 2006 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Maldives 2008 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Mali 2007 0 0 0 1 0 0 16 
Mauritania 2004 0 0 0 1 0 0 40 
Mozambique 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Nepal 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Niger 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Rwanda 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Samoa 2005 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 
Sao Tome and Principe 2007 0 0 2 0 0 0 23 
Senegal 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Sierra Leone 2008 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Solomon Islands 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 
Sudan 2007 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Tanzania 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Togo 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 
Tuvalu 2007 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 
Uganda 2007 0 4 0 0 0 0 26 
Vanuatu 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Yemen 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Zambia 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
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